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While a large literature exists on the siting of controversial facilities, few theories about spatial location
have been tested on large samples. Using a new dataset from Japan, this paper demonstrates that state
agencies choose localities judged weakest in local civil society as host communities for controversial
projects. In some cases, powerful politicians deliberately seek to have facilities such as nuclear power
plants, dams and airports placed in their home constituency. This paper then explores new territory:
how demographic, political and civil society factors impact the outcomes of siting attempts. It finds
that the strength of local civil society impacts the probability that a proposed project will come to
fruition; the greater the concentration of local civil society, the less likely state-planned projects will
be completed.
Keywords: Spatial location; controversial facilities; nuclear power plant; airport; dam; civil society;
Japan; NIMBY.
1. Introduction
Siting controversial facilities remains a critical problem for industrialized and industrializing
nations alike (Rabe, 1994; McAvoy, 1999; Lesbirel, 1998; Garcia-Gorena, 1999; Quah and
Tan, 2002). Governments around the world seeking to construct new infrastructure such as
liquid natural gas storage facilities, airports (Apter and Sawa, 1984; Altshuler and Luberoff,
2003) and waste incinerators face strong opposition. Previous work has sought to connect
the choice of locations for such often-unwanted projects to minority concentration (Pastor,
Sadd and Hipp, 2001), economic conditions (Mohai and Bryant, 1992) and political par-
ties in power (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993). Despite progress in identifying potential
explanations for siting heuristics, no consensus in the field exists (Atlas, 2001; Wolverton,
2002).
This paper builds on work by Hamilton (1993) and Clingermayer (1994) to test conven-
tional explanations for spatial location along with the hypothesis that the strength of local
civil society best predicts which geographically-appropriate localities are chosen for nuclear
power plants, dams and airports. Using a new dataset from Japan with approximately 500
observations, a rare event logit (relogit) analysis provides evidence that the strength of local
networks, more than alternative explanations, best determines locations for these projects.
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I theorize that state authorities seek to avoid costly delays and conflict and locate unwanted
projects in areas they believe will be acquiescent, or at least non-resistant, to proposed facil-
ities. The paper then breaks new ground by demonstrating that areas with weaker local civil
society are more likely to see proposed facilities come on line, while stronger ones have
greater potential to block such projects.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides evidence that cases from Japan
can provide insights into facility siting around the world. Section 3 reviews the relevant
literature on facility siting, Section 4 explains the creation of and variables within the dataset,
and Section 5 provides the results for the selection of sites for nuclear power plants, airports
and dams in Japan. Section 6 investigates how the strength of civil society impacts the
success or failure of siting attempts. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the findings, an
interpretation of the results and an assessment of broader lessons.
2. Japan as a Representative Case
Japan provides an excellent setting for testing hypotheses about the factors critical in the
siting of controversial facilities because of its high population density, variety of policy
instruments used in handling siting, and differing levels of success at siting across facility
types. Japan continues to grapple with high population density, with 30 times asmany people
as theUSon every square kilometer of habitable land.Urban land prices in Japan skyrocketed
over the post-war period due to the shortage of available space, and even after the bursting
of the “bubble economy” of the 1990s land prices in Tokyo remain among the highest in
the world. Given the scarcity of available land, Japanese government officials must work
doubly hard at selecting sites. If Japanese officials cannot solve these problems and “pass
the buck” to future generations, the costs for siting, negotiation and compensation will only
rise. Their decision-making in selecting sites for nuclear power plants, dams and airports
provides broader insights into other national and institutional contexts where issues of land
scarcity and higher prices are beginning to surface.
A variety of different strategies are available to Japanese state agencies confronting the
problem of siting public bads. Bureaus locate facilities through eminent domain, voluntary
procedures involving compensation, education, public relations, and appeals to nationalism.
The Japanese Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) within the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Construction (MOC) and the Min-
istry of Transportation (MOT) handle nuclear power plants, dams and airports, respectively.1
While some ministries relied primarily on coercive methods, others adopted a full spectrum
of soft social control strategies to reduce citizen opposition to planned projects. The cases
under study here, therefore, reflect not just a single, dominant approach to siting, but rather
a number of different state strategies for handling citizen opposition that can be found in the
toolkits of other governments.
1In January 2001, the Ministries of Transportation and Construction were folded into the newMinistry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transportation (MLIT), and MITI was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI). These mostly cosmetic alterations do not impact the core arguments within this article.
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Observers have been surprised at the success that Japan, the only nation in the world to
have experienced nuclear weapons, experienced in its commercial nuclear reactor program,
which supplies one-third of its electricity through 54 reactors. In recent decades, however,
Japan, like the US, Germany, Italy and other advanced industrial democracies, has faced
rising local opposition to nuclear plant facilities. Despite increasing subsidies, lead times
for reactors, including negotiations with local communities, licensing and construction, have
increased threefold over the past three decades (Aldrich, 2005a,b). Government energy plans
have been scaled back in a number of areas, and recent public documents acknowledge the
difficulties in achieving “local understanding” over plant siting. Further, Japan has experi-
enced many non-nuclear land use conflicts, over issues including the construction of airports
and high-speed rail lines (Apter and Sawa, 1984; Groth, 1987) and the placement of US mil-
itary bases (Smith, 2000). Japan’s successes and failures in facility siting must be explained,
and not taken for granted. In short, as Lesbirel (1998) has argued, Japan provides an excel-
lent window into how bureaucracies and decision makers around the world, pressed both for
resources and available land, handle the problem of controversial facility siting.
3. Literature Review
In explaining the selection of sites for controversial facilities, past work has focused on six
main factors: technocratic criteria, partisan discrimination, environmental racism, economic
conditions, political intervention and civil society.
Government officials involved in choosing locations for such projects typically hold that
technocratic criteria, such as aseismic bedrock, sufficient water supplies necessary for such
facilities and distance to existing infrastructure, dictate sites. Technocratic criteria are non-
political characteristics of the local landscape, and hence not a function of local demographic,
economic or social conditions. Areas whichmeet the specified technical qualifications— the
ability to withstand a strong earthquake, proximity to the electrical grid and transportation
networks, and so forth — are ranked accordingly. Hence, a site immediately proximal to
water located on strong bedrock and a short distance to the electricity grid would be higher
ranked than one further from the ocean on weaker alluvial soil. Public officials, such as those
in the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States and the members of Japan’s Agency
for Natural Resources, regularly defend their siting of projects on the basis of such neutral
technical criteria (Morone and Woodhouse, 1989, p. 75; Denki jigyo¯ ko¯za henshu¯ iinkai,
1997, pp. 278–279; Quah and Tan, 2002, p. 19).
Theories of partisan discrimination highlight local political support for opposition or
in-office parties. Researchers who adopt this approach argue that in one-party dominant
systems, such as Japan, Mexico and Sweden, towns supporting the opposition party are
punished with a higher concentration of public bads like nuclear power plants (Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth, 1993, p. 129). Towns and villages with high support levels for Social-
ist or Communist members would be saddled with unwanted facilities as “payback” for
their opposition to the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, the long-dominant ruling
party in Japan). Communities which have been long-time supporters of the LDP would be
expected to be free of such facilities. McGillivray (1997, p. 586) similarly argues that in high
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discipline, majoritarian systems, “the government will inflict costs on party-loyal districts
while providing protection to industries concentrated in marginal districts.”
Proponents of the environmental racism argument, on the other hand, see controversial
and unwanted facilities like nuclear power plants and airports located in clusters of ethnic,
racial and religious minorities (Falk, 1982; Gould, 1986; Austin and Schill, 1991; Hurley,
1995; Pastor, Sadd and Hipp, 2001). Such landscapes center on disadvantaged groups who
bear the brunt of public bads. In the United States, for example, numerous waste repositories
and incinerators are found in communities with large populations of African-Americans,
Native Americans and Hispanics (Bullard, 1994).
Another common explanation for the siting of public bads focuses upon the economic
conditions in local communities. For example, small towns in rural North Carolina view
prisons as public goods because of the jobs and other economic benefits (Hoyman, 2002),
despite fears of jail breaks, riots and negative effects on the neighborhood. Others argue that
we are likely to find facilities like industrial waste dumps and incinerators in communities
with lower levels of income (Mohai and Bryant, 1992).
Some scholars would focus on clusters of powerful politicians to illuminate politi-
cal intervention. Analysts have shown that both politicians and governmental authorities
manipulate benefits and costs so that they fall out on specific constituencies within certain
constraints. As “agenda setting [is] fundamentally biased in favor of those who possess
the most resources” (Berry, Portney and Thomson, 1993, p. 103), more powerful, incum-
bent legislators can intervene to alter bureaucratic processes to focus costs and benefits
on a locality-by-locality basis (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981, p. 643). Government
bureaucrats at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), for example, working to complete the
planned Tellico dam, used political intervention to avoid being blocked by the discovery of
an endangered fish in the local waters (Wheeler and McDonald, 1986, p. 212). Similarly,
North Carolina politicians have intervened to bring prisons to their home constituencies
when initial screening has not favored their home districts (Hoyman and Weinberg, 2006).
A final approach to siting revolves around civil society characteristics. Scholarship
focuses on the relative strength of horizontal associations, the ties between individuals and
the depth of shared norms. Research on siting in North America demonstrates that private
developers avoid areas with higher potential for mobilization against their projects (Hamil-
ton, 1993). Authorities recognize that tighter-knit, better connected communities can better
overcomecollective action problems. Similarly, local areaswhich aremadeupofmore homo-
geneous constituents, i.e., areas with stronger horizontal bonds between citizens, are more
likely to create zoning policies which exclude unwanted group homes than heterogeneous
ones (Clingermayer, 1994). In communities with more social capital and better linkages,
anti-facility groups find it easier to mobilize and organize against unwanted projects.
4. Dataset
This section contains information on the sampling methods used to create the dataset along
with a description of proxies for civil society and political variables and descriptive statistics
for the dataset.
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To systematically evaluate patterns of public bads siting, I created a dataset of approxi-
mately 500 Japanese localities from 1955 to 1995 using a variety of sources (a list of which
can be found in the Appendices). The dataset contains only localities which meet the geo-
graphical and geological criteria for siting, such as land which is both impermeable to water
and resistant to seismic shocks (cf. Takada, 1954). A full or even random sample of some of
the 3,000 villages and towns across Japan would not provide much insight into the problem,
as we do not find nuclear power plants located in downtown Tokyo or Osaka, nor do we
find airports on the tops of mountains. I filtered cases through a matching process to isolate
the signal from noise using GIS (Geographic Information System) data to exclude sites on
which administrators would not construct facilities because of loose soil, distance fromwater
supplies or other geographic factors.
4.1. Sampling methods
I used an equal-shares, choice-based sampling method (see King and Zeng, 2001a,b; King
et al., 1994, Sec. 4.4.2) using politically defined localities (towns, cities and villages) as
the unit of analysis to generate 475 observations. I deliberately selected observations to
include the entire universe of facility host communities in which state agencies played a
major role. By collecting observations where siting attempts for a nuclear plant, dam or
airport occurred (but may or may not have been completed), along with carefully matched
observations where no controversial facility was proposed but which still shared the same
geographic, geologic and temporal characteristics, I achieved greater analytical power with
fewer total observations.
The observations in my dataset where Y = 1 constitute the entire universe of attempted
siting cases of nuclear power plants and airports in which the Japanese central government
acted as an entrepreneur or founder of the project, and half of the dam cases where the
state played a similar role (dam cases were selected at random). I chose airport, dam and
nuclear power plant siting attempts because the Japanese and other national governments
regularly face resistance when attempting to build these large-scale facilities. The balance
of observations where Y = 0 (where no siting was attempted) and Y = 1 (where the
government sought to locate a facility in the locality) within the dataset was approximately
equal (Yˆ = 0.494), hence the label “equal shares”.
I matched the set of caseswhere authorities attempted siting against thosewhere no siting
had occurred temporally, geographically and geologically. Analysts who build observational
datasets without ensuring that their cases involve “apples and apples”, as opposed to dis-
similar subject samples, do so at their peril (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Reiter, 2000). In
matching the observations where Y = 0, I followed the explicit decision heuristics of siting
authorities according to both interviews and archival records. To assist me in selecting cases
where no siting attempt had occurred, I relied upon both GIS data and extensively detailed
geological and geographical maps of Japan. Accordingly, areas where nuclear powers plants
could potentially be sited met four geologic, geographic and demographic criteria: (1) solid
bedrock (and not alluvial plain), to ensure aseismicity; (2) distance from large population
centers such as Osaka and Tokyo; (3) proximity to water, so that cooling towers could draw
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in seawater to dissipate heat from the nuclear reactors; and (4) relatively low population
density, to ensure the evacuation plans would be feasible.
I excluded a number of landlocked prefectures from the nuclear power plant potential
sample subgroup of the Y = 0 set because of their lack of access to seawater (Tochigi,
Gunma, Saitama, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu and Nara). I excluded others because of ground
quality (Toyama), and an additional one because of the need for evacuation plans (Tokyo).
Potential host communities for dams and similar water projects (river gates, rerouting, etc.)
required bodies of water, and, when possible, bodies of water which extended across pre-
fectural boundaries as the central government is most likely to build dams on “first grade”
rivers which do so. Thus, I excluded Fukuoka and Nagasaki prefectures from possible dam
locations. Airports required proximity to large urban centers along with suitable geographic
conditions (no whole prefectures were excluded from the possible airport siting location
subset). These balancing cases also matched the Y = 1 cases in terms of time; observations
match on both spatial and temporal axes so that each case of an actual siting attempt in
19XX is balanced by a non-event in 19XX which has the same suitability for a controversial
project.
4.2. Civil society proxies
I make a priori assumptions about civil society, namely that social capital is not distributed
evenly within nations. Instead, the social infrastructure relevant for siting decisions is made
up of autonomous, primarily local groups, the strength ofwhich vary from locality to locality.
I measure the strength of civil society using both measures of quality and relative capacity;
groups may have one without the other. The quality of civil society is the strength and depth
of bonds between citizens; neighborhood associations with high levels of participation,
for example, can better monitor crime, push for upgrades to local facilities and maintain
community standards than those with declining or non-active memberships.
Previous studies have shown that rapid population growth increases turnover (Hammel,
1990, p. 185), breaks apart community connections and increases alienation (Freudenburg,
1984). Rapid population changes due to events such as economic development are often
associatedwith broad, negative social impacts such as increases in crime (Siegel andAlwang,
2005, p. 7), increases in gang population (Spergel, 1990, p. 232) and a breakdown in local
networks. Areas which have maintained stable population levels are more likely to have
intact social networks which allow citizens to overcome collective action problems and
mobilize on issues, such as protesting against unwanted facilities. Localities experiencing a
large influx of newcomers may be more likely to be targeted by authorities for controversial
facilities because protest efforts in these communities are more vulnerable and more likely
to fracture under pressure (Putnam, 1993; Munton, 1996, p. 307). Based on this research, I
measure the quality of civil society in Japan as the change in population from 1950 until the
time of the siting attempt.
The quantity or relative capacity of social capital can be determined through relative
measures of the strength of such organizations’ memberships vis-à-vis opponents and com-
peting groups. Putnam (2000), for example, mourns declining membership and participation
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rates in community, fraternal and civic organizations as signs of disengagement from politi-
cal and public life. Sheingate (2001, p. 27) emphasizes that organizationswith higher relative
capacity maintain advantages over competing groups as such associations can better capture
limited resources. For this study, the relevant civic groups most likely to be active in siting
processes for controversial facilities are cooperatives made up of farmers and fishermen.
Because the technical requirements for nuclear power plants, dams and airports regularly
place these facilities in rural areas, these primary sector workers often participate in siting
processes, and, more importantly, regularly join together in collectives and associations.
In Japan, national laws provide fishermen’s cooperatives (gyogyo¯ ro¯do¯ kumiai) with veto
powers over the siting process (Tsebelis, 2002); a majority must agree through a formal vote
to a contract with site developers for the plant to proceed (Lesbirel, 1998).
Furthermore, the concerns of fishermen and farmers have been heightened by past acci-
dents and by potential impacts upon their livelihoods. Developers sited all of Japan’s nuclear
power facilities on oceans, and the process of cooling the reactors draws in ocean water and
expels waste water at a temperature of 6◦C higher than standard water. Fishermen became
alarmed over this practice after studies showed that plants released both hot water and
radioactive elements back into the ocean (NGSK, February 1966, Vol. 10, No. 2; Asahi
Shinbun, 23 March 1972). Along with fears about direct impact on their jobs and health,
fishermen and farmers regularly express concern about “nuclear blight”, i.e., the contam-
ination of their produce and harvests and because of lost sales due to fears or rumors of
radioactivity (cf. Tabusa, 1992, p. 244).
Political power can increase both with absolute (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Fung,
2004) and relative (Sheingate, 2001) group size. Larger groups can amass more votes, dona-
tions as well as letter writers and protestors, and can better pressure state leaders and decision
makers. When facing off against competing civil society organizations, relatively stronger
groups can better acquire their goals. In reviewing potential host communities, however, the
long-term capacity of voluntary associations, not just the size of relevant groups at the initial
siting attempt, forms the core concern for state authorities. This is because siting times for
facilities, such as Logan International Airport’s additional runway or the Higashido¯ri nuclear
plant in Japan, can stretch up to three decades (AP News, 18 April 2005; Lesbirel, 1998).
Siting authorities analyzing potential sites for atomic reactors in Japan, for example, calcu-
late that villages that suffer from problems like depopulation of fishermen, low community
solidarity and pollution are less able to resist siting attempts which still might be ongoing in
20 years.
Imeasure civil society quantity as the change in employment in the percentage ofworkers
employed in the primary sector from 1980 through 1995. Less than 1% of the primary sector
in Japan is involved in non-fishing/farming practices (e.g., mining); therefore, measures of
the primary sector capture the capacity of farmers and fishermen in the locality. Furthermore,
because joint fishery rights and licenses for operations are granted almost exclusively to fish-
ery associations (Ruddle, 1987), and because of economic and social pressures on farmers,
membership rates in cooperatives and associations for Japanese farmers and fishermen are
well above 98%. Changes in this percentage over time reflect the strength of fishermen and
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farmers vis-à-vis their community and other potential competitors. 70% of the nuclear power
plant siting attempts took place during this time period with the remainder taking place in
the 1960s and 1970s; even for earlier attempts, this variable still measures the long-term
viability of occupations in the first sector. Previous research on the siting of externalities
relies on similar proxy variables when systematic data is not available. Hamilton (1993,
p. 107), for example, uses the percentage of the voting age population that voted in the 1980
presidential election “to measure the potential for residents to overcome free-rider problems
and engage in collective action.”
4.3. Political proxies
I measure the presence of hegemonic and opposition party legislators through data on the
number and percentage of such representatives in Japan’s Upper House of Parliament. I
measured over-time support for the Liberal Democratic Party by compiling a yearly, pre-
fectural index of votes for LDP candidates in the Upper House (House of Councilors) and
averaged each area’s score between 1956 and 1989. I used Upper House election data as
opposed to Lower House (House of Representatives) elections data for three main reasons.
First, Upper House elections take place at regularly scheduled intervals, and their outcomes
are not endogenous with election timing, as is often a problem with Lower House elec-
tions. Second, unlike the Lower House electoral processes, Upper House elections are non-
personalistic and are seen to reflect party interest, not personal voting patterns (Curtis, 1971,
1999). Finally, Upper House election data map well onto prefectures thanks to the SNTV
districting procedures. To analyze the effect of powerful hegemonic politicians, I tracked
the number of politicians in the LDP serving six terms or longer in the Lower House. Those
who do so are often referred to as daijin, or Cabinet-level politicians, in Japanese, because
long tenure candidates regularly gain seats within the Cabinet. I separately measured the
presence or absence of Prime Ministers from these localities.
Alongwith variables capturing civil society and political factors in the localities, I control
for a variety of standard variables, such as district magnitude, population density, the area
of the village or town and time period, which are defined in Table 1.
5. Results: Picking Sites
In analyzing the dataset, I build on previous work (Hamilton, 1993, p. 102; Lesbirel, 1998;
Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999; Wolverton, 2002) which models the siting of public bads and
controversial facilities as a function of demographic, political, economic and social factors.
I use rare event logic (relogit) analyses to tease out the individual effects of factors related to
civil society, economic, demographic and political variables because the siting process takes
place in two binary-choice stages. Authorities make an initial choice of a host from among
technically feasible areas. If excluded, a locality is out of the picture. If included, the process
moves forward to the next round where local political, demographic and temporal factors
shape the outcome and determine whether the siting succeeds or fails. Logistic regression
involves a binary variable (selected/not selected in the first stage, successful/failed attempt in
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Siting Data Variables, 1945–1995
Variable Description Mean Standard
Deviation
Min. Max.
Dependent Variables Siting Outcomes
Inclusion/Exclusion Dummy variable; 0 if no
attempt, 1 if attempt
0.494 0.500 0 1
Overall Siting Outcome Three-step ordinal variable; 0 if
no attempt, 1 if attempt
failed, 2 if successful
0.875 0.935 0 2
Independent Variables Civil Society and Powerful Politicians
Civil Society Quality
(Community solidarity)
% Population change from
1950 until the siting attempt




Change in percentage of
primary sector employment,
1980–1995
−0.32 0.216 −0.88 0.623
Powerful Politicians Number of LDP members
serving 6+ consecutive
terms
1.644 1.010 0 4
Political, Economic and Demographic Characteristics
Post-1975 Dummy variable; 1 if siting
attempt in or after 1975, 0 if
before
0.625 0.485 0 1
Town Area Square kilometers 136 139.203 3 869.1
Population Density Population per square kilometer 509.2 1,321.484 5.6 14,652
District Magnitude Number of Lower House seats 4.097 0.816 2 6
Economic Growth Change in tertiary sector,
1980–1995
0.155 0.193 −0.4 1.368
Majority Party
Over-Time Support Average prefectural LDP vote
share — Upper House
elections, 1956–1989
0.517 0.084 0.27 0.678
Percentage in Lower House Percentage of seats from the
district held by LDP
members
0.639 0.188 0 1
Number of Reps in Lower
House
Number of LDP seats in the
Lower House
2.566 0.840 0 5
Presence of Prime Minister Number of LDP politicians in
office during siting who
served or would go on to
serve as Prime Minister
0.114 0.332 0 2
Opposition Party
Socialists in LH Number of Socialists in the
Lower House
1.002 0.616 0 3
Communists in LH Number of seats held by
Communists in the Lower
House
0.087 0.282 0 1
Other Party Members in
Lower House
Number of seats held by other
parties
0.417 0.685 0 4
Minority Concentration
Minority Representation (1) Dummy variable; 1 if siting
attempt in Hokkaido, 0 if not
0.072 0.259 0 1
Minority Representation (2) Dummy variable; 1 if siting
attempt in Okinawa, 0 if not
0.017 0.129 0 1
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the second) and follows the Bernoulli probability function. Because the events under study
here are rare, i.e., there are far more instances where Japanese towns were not selected as
hosts for controversial facilities than those were, the standard logit form provides biased
estimators. A rare events logistic, or relogit, model developed by King and Zeng (2001a,b)
addresses these concerns.2
5.1. Simulation, confidence intervals and estimate correction
To enhance the presentation of results, rather than displaying conventional tables of coef-
ficient estimators, I provide simulations and confidence intervals to produce more intuitive
displays of the variables (with standard coefficient tables available in the Appendices). Con-
fidence intervals allow investigators to “express the appropriate degree of certainty around…
quantities”, while simulation techniques allow us to “extract the currently overlooked infor-
mation” and “interpret and present it in a reader-friendly manner” (King, Tomz and Witten-
berg, 2000, p. 341). In simulation, we “learn about a distribution by taking random draws
from it.” Once we have taken the random draws, we can use them to approximate a feature of
the distribution (Tomz and Wittenberg, 1999, p. 11). The predicted probability of interest is
displayed as a solid line, with the lines bounding it on each side showing the 95% confidence
intervals. For these simulations, I set all independent variables at their means except for the
quantity of interest. The graphs found throughout this section are based on the results from
the prior corrected estimators.
Prior correction and weighting comprise the two main methods for correcting estimates.
Such additional techniques must be employed to “compensate for differences in the sample
(yˆ) and population (τ ) fraction of ones induced by choice-based sampling” (King and Zeng,
2001a, p. 144). Because prior corrections require proper model specification, it is slightly
disadvantageous when compared to weighting (Xie and Manski, 1989). Although prior
corrected estimators are more suspect than weighted ones because of the possibility of
model misspecification, in many cases, analytic limits prevented the proper calculation of
estimators using the actual weight correction (i.e., 0.0016). The smallest weighting value
that would resolve computationally was far larger, at 0.006, than the actual frequency in the
population.
5.2. Results: Siting nuclear power plants in Japan
For nuclear power plant siting attempts, civil society variables proved highly significant,
while others did not. Within a pool of technically appropriate sites, developers in Japan
select host communities for nuclear power plants based on the quality and relative capacity
of civil society. In some cases, where powerful politicians can override decision making
2Another way to view the siting process is as a spectrum. Depending on the strength of organized civil society,
some localities may be willing to accept, others less willing, and some completely unwilling to do so. To confirm
that the coefficient estimates were not strongly affected by the two-stage relogit model type, I also carried out
an ordered probit (oprobit) analysis with a three-category ordinal-dependent variable using the spectrum model.
The results of the oprobit model, while not shown here, confirm that civil society factors proved most significant.
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processes, political intervention draws these facilities into constituencies of long-time LDP
incumbents. Authorities were most likely to attempt sitings of reactors in communities with
low community solidarity and diminished or decreasing levels of social capital. In some
cases, legislators who had served for at least six terms in office intervened in the siting
process to bring these facilities into their districts.
Those communities which maintained or increased membership in civil society groups
had a far smaller chance of being selected as hosts for nuclear plants. A community which
merely sustained its population of fishermen and farmers over the measured time was almost
100 times less likely to be chosen as a site for a nuclear power plant than one which lost
80% of its capacity vis-à-vis other sectors, as Figure 1 displays.
The Japanese government and utility developers long recognized the importance of
studying the concentration of first sector workers in potential public bad sites. When the
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) worked with the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) to site reactors in Fukushima prefecture during the early 1960s, it
measured levels of commercial fishing and took into account membership in local fishing
cooperatives. Arguments for siting in the area of Futaba-machi hinged on the point that it
is “not an important area for fishing” (NGSK, 1964, Vol. 8, No. 6, p. 21). Similarly, when
Chubu Electric Power Company began surveys of the Ashihama district near the Kumano
Sea, they predicted that the area would be more amenable to nuclear power plant siting
because of the paucity of fishermen’s cooperatives there compared with the nearby village
of Oshiraike (NGSK, 1964, Vol. 8, No. 8, p. 42). Nuclear plant developers bemoaned the
fact that even though they had done their best to pick rural areas where resistance would be
low, it was likely that local fishing cooperatives would cause “problems to arise over new
projects”. Fishermen sought to move the discussion beyond local siting issues when they
Figure 1. Authorities More Likely to Select Localities with Weaker Civil Society
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organized a national forum of fishing unions to discuss the problem of siting (NGSK, 1966,
Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 15).
As long as local fishermen and farmer cooperatives could at least maintain their relative
strength over time, siting authorities judged them as able to fight off proposed public bads.
On the other hand, nuclear power plant authorities were more likely to select areas facing
diminished capacity of fishing and farming cooperatives as the site of a nuclear power plant,
as indicated by the steep curve rising from the point where relative group strength drops
by more than 20%. The village of Tomari on the northern island of Hokkaido, for example,
experienced drastic relative losses in its fishing and farming associations, core groups within
local civil society.
While initially a third of the village of Tomari had been members of fishermen and
farmer’s cooperatives, by 1995, less than 5% of the village remained engaged in those occu-
pations (with little shift in the overall population). With fewer members of these voluntary
associations to resist state plans, developers selected Tomari not for one, but for three nuclear
power plants. On the other hand, the nearby village of Taisei, also on the northern island
of Hokkaido, maintained close to one-fourth of its working population as fishermen and
farmers over the same period, and, as a result of its stronger social capital, was not selected
by authorities as a host community.
Along with capacity of local groups, the quality of civil society also plays a role in siting
decisions for nuclear power plants in Japan. Areas with lower levels of interpersonal trust
and fewer interconnections and local networks were more likely to be chosen as hosts, while
those with stable, intact networks were better able to fend off selection. Figure 2 shows
that localities which either lost overall population or maintained it were far less likely to
be chosen for nuclear power plants than those facing increases of 70% or more. The town
Figure 2. Authorities Select Communities with Weakening Social Ties
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of Ohmiya in Saitama prefecture more than doubled its population over a 20-year period,
a surge which weakened existing ties between neighbors. The influx of newcomers made
it difficult to establish bonds with new residents, and without strong ties to facilitate area
residents’ cooperativemobilization together against a facility, developers selected it as a host
community for a nuclear power plant. Similarly, the village of Kumatori near Osaka found
its population swelling by 9,000 new residents over the pre-siting period, an event which
increased its citizen base by more than 90%. Kumatori, like Ohmiya, was selected as a host
for a nuclear power plant.
Areas with rapidly increasing populations are unable to maintain the social networks and
ties which make mobilization and opposition easier. These communities are more likely to
fragment under pressures such as offers of compensation, and hence, are less able to present
a united front against siting.
While estimates of civil society strength (in termsof both quality and relative capacity) are
the primary factors driving siting decisions, powerful legislators can intervene in the process
and gently skew it to pull these projects into their districts. Powerful Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) politicians who served six consecutive terms or more are usually promoted to
Cabinet-level positions. These conservative, pro-growth politicians regularly supported pro-
nuclear mayors and urged local residents to see nuclear power as safe and necessary (Nikkei,
17 March 1981; NGSK, 1981, Vol. 3, p. 35). Communities with more of these well-known
and prominent representatives are slightly more likely to be chosen as sites for nuclear power
plants; Figure 3 shows that communities with no powerful politicians were six times less
likely to be chosen than their counterparts with four or more such representatives.
While folk theorems — often premised on the American electoral system — argue that
powerful politicians should shield their constituents against these often dreaded facilities
Figure 3. Having More Powerful Legislators Increases the Probability of Political Intervention
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(and instead bring in facilities like docks and bridges), support from the business commu-
nity pushes politicians to seek them out. As one researcher argued, “many local politicians in
Japan … actually benefit politically and electorally from actively promoting noxious facili-
ties in their own electorates because of the economic benefits yielded” (Lesbirel, 1998, p. 8).
In many interviews, LDP Diet members discussed their strong support for these projects
and argued forcefully against seeing them as unwanted or controversial facilities (meiwaku
shisetsu in Japanese) (Interviews, 2002–2003). Powerful politicians like former Prime Min-
ister Kakuei Tanaka openly discussed their successful drive to bring nuclear projects to
their electoral districts (Tanaka, 1972; Schlesinger, 1997, pp. 72 and 103).3 The town of
Kashima in Shimane prefecture, though it has lost only around 17% of its fisherman and
farmers, and actually slightly decreased the population, was nonetheless selected as a host
for nuclear power plants, evidently because of the power of its four long-term, incumbent
LDP representatives in the national legislature.
The politicians fromKashima includedNoboruTakeshita,whowould become a powerful
Prime Minister, and some lesser known long-term incumbents, such as Yoshi Sakurauchi.
Similarly, the town of Kariwa in Niigata prefecture had four politicians who served six or
more terms, including the openly pro-nuclear Kakuei Tanaka (another Prime Minister), and
the lesser known Shin Sakurai. Kariwa and its sister city of Kashiwazaki ended up hosting
seven plants. Interestingly, electing a powerful legislator who becomes prime minister is
not sufficient to override the siting process; rather, it requires several powerful legislators to
do so.
5.3. Results: Siting airports in Japan
My analysis of airport siting cases in Japan reveals that the relative capacity, more than
quality, of local civil society strongly affects siting decisions. Aswith other public bads, once
authorities have excluded non-suitable sites for airports, they do not place them in areas heavy
with minority group concentrations as political discrimination against minority opposition
parties, or based on local economic factors. Figure 4 shows that areaswithweakening relative
capacity of fishermen and farmers were farmore likely to be selected as host communities for
airports than their counterpartswith stronger fishing and farming communities.A community
which lost more than 75% of its relative strength of cooperative and union members is more
than 10 times as likely to be chosen as the site for an airport.
Farmers make up the largest number of first sector workers affected by airports which,
because of their need for vast, open spaces, regularly expropriate available farmland. In
Chiba prefecture, where authorities located Tokyo’s Narita Airport, the agricultural sector
actually increased over the decades preceding the airport’s announcement. FollowingWorld
War II, many demobilized soldiers and repatriated colonial families were brought to the
area, which was partly an imperial estate, to work as farmers. In an uncommon display of
3Tanaka also displayed his savvy at pork barrel politics when he set up the Local Development Subcommittee in
the House of Representatives in 1949 to assist the siting of hydroelectric dams and other public works projects
in home districts (Calder, 1988, p. 301).
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Figure 4. State Selects Localities with Weaker Local Civil Society for Airports
violent resistance, these farming communities quickly mobilized to resist the siting of the
airport, delaying its opening by more than seven years and leading to nearly 30 years of
conflict with state security forces. The strong violence during the Narita siting attempt was
surprising to many observers of Japanese politics (Apter and Sawa, 1984). However, given
the increasing numbers of farmers in the period before the siting attempt took place, this
model would predict that siting would be difficult.
5.4. Results: Siting dams in Japan
In dam siting cases, none of the variables under investigation, including civil society, political
and minority discrimination and economic conditions, proved significant. Instead, the size
of the locality in which the dam is proposed best explains which locality will be chosen from
among a pool of similarly suitable sites. Cities and villages with more square kilometers
of land were more likely to be chosen than those with less. I speculate that localities with
larger areas have a larger supply of land, resulting in lower prices for the state and other dam
developers who seek to purchase acreage. Further research could gather direct real estate
prices for the 500 or so towns under study here to clarify the role played by land prices in
site selection.
5.5. Confirming the direction of causality
Observers may be concerned that the actual direction of causality in the relationship between
the civil society proxy and the probability of selection as a host community is the reverse of
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what I had described. Perhaps the siting of a nuclear power plant or airport actually decreases
the population of first section workers, which I use as a proxy for civil society. To test this
argument, I use propensity scorematching and average treatment effects.Matching produces
balance between control and treatment groups andprovides an alternative to standard analysis
techniques even in observational studies (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985; Angrist and
Krueger, 1999, pp. 1314–1315). We estimate average treatment effects (ATE) on the treated
units “by averaging within match differences in the outcome variable between the treated
and untreated units” (Abadie and Imbens, 2002, p. 1).
Using nearest neighbor matching, the effect of siting a public bad on the percentage
change in primary workers over the 1980 to 1995 period was−0.0665, a figure statistically
significant at the 0.003 level. That is, the placement of a nuclear power plant, dam or airport
in a locality is responsible, on average, for a decrease of less than 7% in the employment rates
of farmers and fishermen there. There is a feedback effect on local fishermen and farmers
from siting, but it is a minor one. For example, all other factors being equal, a 7% decrease
in the concentration of workers in the primary sector has little effect on the probability of
selection as host community; the threshold effect for locational inclusion for nuclear power
plants, for example, is closer to −30%. Given that the average locality in this dataset saw a
decrease of more than 20% in its primary employment over that time period, I believe that
concern about reverse-causality is misplaced. Public bad siting is primarily a function of the
health of the primary sector, which measures civil society strength, and not vice versa.
6. Results: Success or Failure of Siting Attempts
Having investigated the role that civil society plays in the selection of sites for nuclear
power plants, airports and dams, I now seek to investigate if these same factors play a role
in affecting the completion or failure of the proposed project. While states avoid siting
in areas with stronger local horizontal associations, enhanced social networks and fewer
powerful politicians, how these same social capital characteristics affect the outcomes of
siting attempts has not been thoroughly explored. It may be, for example, that state forecasts
of resistance are inaccurate, and that areas with stronger civil society may be no better
equipped to fight off the proposed facility than those with weaker social ties.
If a developer seeks to place a public bad in an area with relatively strong horizontal
associations, how will it fare? As predicted by arguments about the impact of civil society
upon the state policies, Figure 5 shows that localities in Japan with higher quantities of civil
society are better equipped to fend off siting attempts of all three types of facilities. Areas
that can maintain or increase the relative strength of farmers and fishermen’s cooperatives
decrease the probability that a proposed public bad will come to completion in their locality.
For example, an area selected as the host community for a nuclear power plant, dam or
airport which has lost close to three-quarters of its civil society membership has close to
a 95% chance of seeing that facility come online. However, an area that has increased its
membership in these NGOs and cooperatives by half has a 70% chance of stopping these
projects.
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Figure 5. Stronger Civil Society Decreases Likelihood of Siting Success
Another important factor in determining the outcome of siting attempts is the history of
other public bads in the area. Once an initial public bad is located in a town or village, the
choices of additional public bads being successfully located in that area jump drastically, as
seen in Figure 6. Localities with an existing facility were most likely to see a new facility
come to completion. An area which already has one nuclear power plant is far more likely
to allow the siting of additional plants than those which have none. This figure shows how
moving from having no prior public bads to a single one increases the probability of a
new, proposed facility being completed successfully by more than 20%. After hosting two
controversial facilities, the success of future attempts is all but assured. This behavior helps
explain the large clusters of public bads in single areas, especially nuclear power plants, in
Japan, where we often see groups of six or seven reactors within the same community.
The locality of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in Niigata prefecture currently hosts seven nuclear
reactors. Such clustering may be due to habituation, so that additional projects no longer
entail large political costs because locals become used to the idea of such a facility and engage
in less opposition to further facility siting. This could also indicate a sense of fatalism, where
communities believe that they will not be able to stop future projects, dampening activism.
Alternatively, the community may have developed “skill sets” from the siting of the initial
project, such as how to extract additional rents and revenues from the central government4 and
how to overcome small but vocal opposition, so the later projects encounter less resistance.
4Some observers describe local government officials learning how to extract additional resources from the
Japanese central government under threat of sabotaging or stalling additional facilities.
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Figure 6. Presence of Other Public Bads Increases Likelihood of Future Siting Success
Citizen activists criticize this as “addiction” because local communities become used to
spending beyond the normal budgets with the additional income brought by new public
bads (Hasegawa, 2004, p. 27). As a result, they are forced to take on additional projects to
maintain their spending levels and avoid going into debt.
7. Conclusions
This paper has tested six major theories which seek to explain site selection for controver-
sial facilities along with investigating the factors that increase or decrease the chances of a
proposed project coming to completion. Based on these results, while it may be accurate to
argue that neutral, non-political criteria such as geographic and geological features exclude
inappropriate sites, as bureaucrats and state agencies often claim, placement within techni-
cally feasible locations is not random. Once the necessary technical features for sites have
been taken into account, other factors strongly impact siting decisions.
States initially choose locations for their controversial facilities from a set of technically
feasible sites based on measures of the strength of civil society at the local level. Especially
with the most dreaded and contested projects— nuclear power plants— civil society proves
to be the most critical of a number of possible explanations for how sites are chosen. The
strength of civil society organizations such as fishermen’s and farming cooperatives and the
solidarity between neighbors in a community regularly and measurably impact state siting
policies. States around the world, such as the United Kingdom, undertake similar investiga-
tions to estimate potential oppositionwithin civil society, sometimes through straightforward
surveys (Rüdig, 1994, p. 84). French authorities may have selected several localities in Nor-
mandy based on survey research which showed towns in that area to be more favorable to
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siting than in other regions (data reproduced in Hecht, 1998, p. 248). While evidence sup-
ports civil society strength as the core siting characteristic in cases from multiple nations, in
some cases, a sufficient number of powerful politicians can override standard siting logics
to draw in projects that they — but perhaps not most of their constituency — imagine as
beneficial.
The data did not support other standard theories of site selection. I find no evidence
that the dominant Japanese political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), punishes
opposition-supporting localities by siting more unwanted projects in their backyards. Given
the small numbers of minorities in Japan and the technical requirements for these large-scale
projects, authorities did not measurably discriminate against minorities when siting these
projects, as none of these facilities can be located in large cities where Koreans, burakumin
and other ethnic minorities live.5 Further, second-level tests of the environmental racism
hypothesis uncover no systematic attempts to locate nuclear power plants, dams or airports
in Hokkaido and Okinawa, areas known for their minority populations.
The evidence presented here does not confirm that economics determine siting outcomes
for these types of projects in Japan. In Japan, economic conditions in communities selected
for these public bads differ little from similar nearby rural towns. Towns selected as nuclear
power plant host communities, for example, have around 41%of their workers inwhite collar
occupations, on average only 1% less than towns meeting the same technical requirements
that were not selected as hosts for reactors. Studies ofwaste facility siting in Canada similarly
dismissed claims that sitingwas based on economic disadvantagewhethermeasured in terms
of income or unemployment (Castle and Munton, 1996, p. 78).
Localities with strong civil society, both in terms of its quantity and quality, represent
the biggest challenge to long-term siting plans for controversial facilities. Such localities are
more expensive targets for state authorities and developers in terms of both time (contacting,
negotiating with or coercing the individuals) and money (if redistribution is used). Areas
with diminished civil society, on the other hand — perhaps because of worsening local
environmental conditions, shifting demographics or diminished market conditions — seem
to serve as ideal hosts for such projects. If technically possible, the state will place the
project in an area with absolutely no local, anti-facility civil society groups, such as in a
remote location or offshore. The majority of Japanese airports built in the last ten years,
for example, have been placed either offshore or in areas already containing a public bad,
5Of course, this does not indicate that siting decisions never involve racism or discrimination. Finding evidence
for siting discrimination against minorities in Japan is difficult, as its four recognized ethnic and demographic
minorities — Okinawans, Ainu, Koreans and burakumin — together comprise only 5% of Japan’s population.
Many Okinawans remain in the island chain once known as the Ryukyus, indigenous Ainu people are clustered
in Hokkaido, while Koreans and burakumin are often found in neighborhoods of metropoles like Kyoto, Osaka
and Tokyo. Stories of ethnic, occupational and social discrimination against these groups are common, and
many Okinawans argue that they have been burdened with the brunt of the North American military presence
because of long-difficult relations with Japan’s main island. However, given the necessary geologic constraints
of nuclear power plants, dams and airports, siting them in densely populated urban areas such as Tokyo and
Kyoto — which also house large numbers of burakumin and Korean residents — is impossible.
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such as a military base.6 In North America, developers have sought to place public bads —
such as the Palo Verde nuclear power plant complex in Arizona’s desert, the yet-to-open
nuclear waste facility in Yucca Mountain, NV, and the new Denver airport — in sites almost
completely free of population. Authorities recognize the benefits in avoiding areas with
the potential for opposition; as a result, “[a]ll of the new airports built in US urban areas
during the 1960s and 1970s” were sited to avoid potential resistance from local civil society
(Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 204).
Once a location has been chosen for a public bad, the strength of social capital again
impacts state policy by increasing (or decreasing) the probability that the facility will be
completed. As imagined by state planners, areas with strong civil society groups better
resist siting attempts than those areas that are losing members. Further, the history of the
community in terms of other public bads makes it more or less likely to be able to resist
further siting attempts. Once a single public bad has been placed in a community, the chances
are very good that the community will receive additional controversial facilities in the future.
This model maps well onto empirical observations of communities in North America and
Japan that have “clusters” of public bads, such as the area known as “Cancer Alley” in
Louisiana that has a high concentration of chemical and petrochemical industries.
This analysis is important for several reasons. This argument is consistent with claims
from the environmental racism literature that authorities often seek out communities with
less political power. Here, I refine these arguments and push analysts to look less at race and
ethnicity and more at the political patterns of representation and civil society organization
strengths in those localities. Next, this paper demonstrates that interest groups, such as local
fishermen’s cooperatives, play a role in the siting process, despite common perceptions of
Japan as a “strong state” in which bureaucracies (by themselves, or in alignment with private
firms) determine overall policy outcomes (Johnson, 1982; Zysman, 1983). Finally, this article
shows that the Japanese state closely monitors local political and demographic conditions
in the process of siting, and hints at larger interactions between the state authorities and
local civil society groups, including the use of a variety of state policy instruments to handle
contestation with restive citizens (Aldrich, 2008).
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Appendix A. Estimated Variable Coefficients
Table A1. Dependent Variable: Selection/Exclusion as Nuclear Power Plant Host






Town Area −0.0003241 0.0003098
0.001842 0.0018185
Population Density −0.0023 −0.0024981
0.0015077 0.0019343
Civil Society Quality 1.989807∗ 2.200953
1.034305 1.94888
Civil Society Capacity −3.489774∗∗∗ 0.4176255
0.8646016 1.627666
Economic Growth 0.56776 −2.573052
1.209316 1.81934
Over-Time LDP Support 2.619029 −0.4385572
2.888152 4.467387
District Magnitude −0.0182725 −0.8009795∗
0.3213291 0.4136665
Number of LDP Reps. in Lower House −0.2919882 1.604455∗∗
0.3778273 0.5283282
LDP Percentage in Lower House 0.6160664 −23.65829∗∗∗
3.094655 6.373597




Number of Socialists in LH −0.2196648 −5.185023∗∗∗
0.6935033 1.619097
Number of Communists in LH 0.8248305 −2.467234
1.087051 1.530033
Other Party Members in Lower House 0.1418938 −3.46013∗
0.7089351 1.298162
Presence of Powerful LDP Member 0.5660802∗ 0.5315239
0.263649 0.3177857




Note: N = 188. Robust standard errors underneath coefficients. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
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Town Area 0.0059299∗∗∗ 0.0060109∗∗∗
0.0014937 0.0015581
Population Density −0.0000403 −0.0000287
0.0002125 0.0003592
Civil Society Quality 0.0843514 0.0491886
0.2834704 0.3937763
Civil Society Capacity 0.934604 1.601061
0.7857395 0.8309749
Economic Growth 0.4346639 1.139615
0.6633055 0.7136825
Over-Time LDP Support 1.473614 −0.8608797
2.189261 2.784575
District Magnitude 0.8189674 0.6387812
1.003085 1.87093
Number of LDP Reps. in Lower House −0.5533782 −0.0737293
1.103293 1.52788
LDP Percentage in Lower House 0.1156739 −0.8111397
2.878367 6.055634




Number of Socialists in LH −1.054791 −0.8141248
1.077583 2.602589
Number of Communists in LH −0.1065617 0.3255861
1.140423 2.765684
Other Party Members in Lower House −0.4500189 −0.1921563
1.091983 2.544873
Presence of Powerful LDP Member −0.0348423 −0.0008165
0.1717304 0.2097103




Note: N = 213. Robust standard errors underneath coefficients. ∗∗∗ p< 0.001,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A3. Dependent Variable: Selection/Exclusion as Host Community
for an Airport






Town Area 0.001305 −0.0029074
0.0022894 0.0051394
Population Density −0.0001811 −0.0010237∗∗
0.0001787 0.0003961
Civil Society Quality 1.314873 0.1640791
0.8345446 1.465862
Civil Society Capacity −6.615531∗∗ 11.58776∗∗
2.830933 3.760149
Economic Growth 1.226662 7.362974
1.982862 5.816747
Over-Time LDP Support −1.617444 −11.80773
3.172469 7.406782
District Magnitude −1.762921 0.9206941
1.907267 3.408477
Number of LDP Reps. in Lower House 2.678297 −1.418932
2.728213 4.497367
LDP Percentage in Lower House −12.23104 13.34968
11.41597 22.16078




Number of Socialists in LH −0.4470351 3.163193∗∗
0.8511377 1.205114
Number of Communists in LH −2.078514 3.743177
1.448118 2.693259
Presence of Powerful LDP Member −0.6942819 1.484187∗
0.4523729 0.6454545




Note: N = 67. Robust standard errors beneath coefficients. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A4. Dependent Variable: Success/Failure for All Three Project Types
Model 1 [logit analysis] Model 2 [logit analysis]
Public Bad Density 2.561819∗∗
0.9524071
Town Area 0.001957 0.001495
0.0017393 0.0016556
Population Density 0.0000325 0.0000137
0.0001743 0.0001603
Civil Society Quality −0.3827791 −0.4682316
0.3880159 0.3722002
Civil Society Capacity −1.93346∗ −2.855864∗∗
1.016933 0.950908
Economic Growth 2.14386 2.216475
1.235862 1.178375
Over-Time LDP Support −0.9586738 −0.3063788
2.881386 2.906257
District Magnitude −0.7398749 0.1112507
0.6421896 0.5235254
Number of LDP Reps. in Lower House 1.709422 0.5911211
0.7642574 0.5529234
LDP Percentage in Lower House −2.206717 0.0358462
3.782558 3.333813




Number of Socialists in LH 1.075158 0.3662007
0.9914259 0.8901509
Number of Communists in LH 0.6623503 −0.1034136
1.09405 1.015997
Other Party Members in Lower House 0.5680249 0.059228
0.9586764 0.8765908
Presence of Powerful LDP Member −0.8808299∗∗∗ −0.8828893∗∗∗
0.2591185 0.2587972




Note: N = 229. Robust standard errors beneath coefficients. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗ p < 0.05.
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Appendix B. Data Sources
Political data
Steven Reed, Shu¯giin Giin So¯senkyo Ko¯hoshabetsu Tokuhyo¯ Kekka 1947–1995 [Japan Elec-
tion Data, House of Representatives, 1947–1995], TakayoshiMiyagawa, Sho¯ senkyoku Han-
dobukku [Handbook of Single Member Constituencies] (Tokyo: Seiji Ko¯ho¯ Senta¯ [Center
for Political Public Relations], 1996), and direct surveys of mayoral offices, gubernatorial
offices, and fishing cooperatives (carried out by the author, June 2002–September 2003).
Facility data
Direct surveys of local ministerial offices and controversial facility siting authorities (by the
author June 2001–September 2001 and June 2002–September 2003), Genshiryoku shiryo¯
jo¯ho¯ shitsu [Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, CNIC],Genshiryoku shimin nenkan 2002
[Citizen’s yearbook on nuclear energy] (Tokyo: CNIC, 2002), Hangenpatsu Undô Zenkoku
Renraku kai [National Anti-Nuclear Liaison Group], Hangenpatsu Shinbun [Anti-Nuclear
Newspaper]. (Tokyo: Hangenpatsu Undo¯ Zenkoku Renraku kai 1978–1998), Asahi Shin-
bun [Asahi Newspaper], Asahi Shinbun Sengo Midashi Sakuin [Asahi Newspaper Headline
Database 1945–1995] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun), Nihon Damu Kyo¯kai [Japan Dam Federa-
tion],DamuNenkan [DamYearbook] (Tokyo:NihonDamuKyôkai, various years), and from
http://www.mlit.go.jp/koku/04_outline/01_kuko/01_haichi/index.html.
Demographic data
To¯yo¯ Keizai Shinpo¯sha, Jinko¯ to¯kei so¯ran: kokusei cho¯sa shu¯taisei [Population Statistics of
Japan: Summary of National Censuses and other Surveys, 1972–1984] (Tokyo: To¯yo¯ Keizai
Shinpo¯sha, 1985), So¯mucho¯ To¯keikyoku [Statistics Bureau, Home Affairs Ministry], Nihon
no Jinko¯: Heisei Ninen Kokuseicho¯sa Saishu¯ho¯kokusho [Population of Japan: Final Report
of the 1990 Population census] (Tokyo: So¯mucho¯ To¯keikyoku, 1995), So¯mucho¯ To¯keikyoku
[Statistics Bureau, Home Affairs Ministry], Nihon no Jinko¯: Heisei Nananen Kokuseicho¯sa
Saishu¯ho¯kokusho [Population of Japan: Final Report of the 1995 Population census] (Tokyo:
So¯mucho¯ To¯keikyoku, 2000), So¯mucho¯ To¯keikyoku [Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Home
Affairs], Heisei Ju¯ninen Kokuseicho¯sa Saishu¯ho¯kokusho Jinko¯so¯su¯, Dai ichi maki [Total
Population: 2000 Population Census of Japan, Volume 1] (Tokyo: So¯mucho¯ To¯keikyoku
2002).
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national Society for Educational Information, Atlas of Japan: Physical, Economic, and
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